Classic network utility maximization problems are usually solved assuming all information is available, implying that information not locally available is always truthfully reported. This may not be practical in all scenarios, especially in distributed/semi-distributed networks. In this paper, incentive for truthful reporting in network optimizations with local information is studied. A novel general model for extending network utility maximization (NUM) problems to incorporate local information is proposed, which allows each user to choose its own objective locally and/or privately.
pricing (congestion price) has been adopted in many works, and a recent example is a study on social welfare maximization in a mobile crowdsensing scenario [24] .
An application of interest for the incentive perspective studies is device-to-device (D2D) communications, in which there can be no traditional network center for D2D links and each user has its own interest. 1 Su et al.
proposed a contract based mechanism to motivate truthful reporting in an overlay D2D resource allocation scenario [25] . Zhao and Song proposed incentive mechanisms to motivate base station data offloading through underlay D2D assisted content distribution [26] . A randomized reverse auction was proposed to incentivize content distribution via D2D communications and offload traffic from the base station [27] . Li et al. designed a double auction-based mechanism to incentivize cellular users with alternative D2D communication capabilities to switch to D2D [28] .
Wang et al. proposed a resource block exchange mechanism in an overlay D2D scenario to reduce interference experienced by D2D users [29] . Xu et al. exploited an iterative combinatorial auction for resource allocation among D2D links with the objective of sum-rate maximization [30] . Xu et al. applied mechanism design in [31] for coordinating D2D users to participate in traffic offloading from the BS. Kebriaei et al. proposed a double auction to allocate bandwidth in a cellular network with a cognitive D2D user [32] . Hajiesmaili et al. designed an auction to achieve load balancing considering battery limits of D2D devices [33] .
C. Our Contributions
Despite the increasing number of related works, there is no general framework that can model a NUM problem with local information, to the best of our knowledge. A close example is [22] , in which general forms of objective functions are used for the network and users. However, the model adopts an optimization perspective and does not capture local information. The objective of this work is to model and study the impact of local information and incentive in solution finding. Two problems are considered. The first is a user-centric problem (UCP), a NUM problem with local information in which the network aims to maximize the collective benefit of users. The second is a network-centric problem (NCP), in which the network aims to maximize its own benefit representing the preference of the network while the users prefer a different solution, e.g., the solution to the UCP. After investigating the UCP and the NCP in general forms, the proposed model is applied to underlay D2D communications. The contributions of this work include the followings.
First, we propose a novel model to capture a NUM problem with local information, in which optimization and incentive perspectives are connected. The proposed model characterizes the interest of a user through two mappings, i.e., an objective function and a valuation function. The objective function maps the optimization variable to a metric such as data rate, energy efficiency, etc. It represents the part that is considered from an optimization perspective.
The valuation function maps the above metric to its corresponding value to a user, which can be local information.
It represents the part that should be handled from an incentive perspective. The model also extends classic NUM problems by allowing each individual user to determine and adopt its own objective locally and, if needed, privately.
Second, dual pricing is studied for the UCP and the insights on when and why dual pricing cannot be used to guarantee truthful reporting are obtained. Dual pricing is of interest since it relates to both a pricing mechanism from the incentive perspective and the dual decomposition technique from the optimization perspective. It is observed in [19] and [34] that dual pricing cannot guarantee truthful reporting in the corresponding problems. However, the results of this work provide more insights on dual pricing in general resource allocation problems. It is shown that dual pricing guarantees truthful reporting only when the resource is oversupplied or when a user could not afford any resource.
Third, we design mechanisms to guarantee truthful reporting when the network has a preferred solution different from the one accepted by the users. We show that, unless this solution is also preferred by at least one user, no mechanism can guarantee truthful reporting and specify a condition under which the network-preferred solution can be achieved. A subsidized exchange mechanism is proposed to motivate truthful reporting and implement the network-preferred solution in a two-user case. The mechanism provides nonnegative and fair utility gain for both users and also a nonnegative gain for the network. For the general multiuser case, a much more complicated situation in which more forms of untruthful reporting exist, we propose an iterative extended subsidized exchange mechanism to guarantee that truthful reporting is the best choice for any rational user.
II. SYSTEM MODEL Consider a network with N users, where a user can be a network node, a communication link, etc. The set of users is denoted as U = {i}
. A network center coordinates the resource allocation among users, where the resource allocated to user i is represented by x i .
A. Objective, Valuation, and Local Information
Each user has an individual objective, such as data rate, energy efficiency, etc. It is assumed that users can have different objectives. This reflects the fact that users may be associated with different applications in a network. For instance, users running throughput-sensitive applications can adopt data rate as their performance metric while users running delay-sensitive applications can adopt delay as their performance metric. Allowing different objectives at different users introduces flexibility in characterizing and coordinating multiuser networks. For users i and j with the same objective o l , it can be argued that they may value b i (x i ) and b j (x j ) differently even if b i (x i ) = b j (x j ). For example, the same energy efficiency of 100 bits/Hz/J can be of different values to users with 8% and 20% respective remaining battery power. This difference reflects different application requirements and resource availability status, e.g., remaining battery power, at the users. To characterize user i's valuation of an achieved objective b i (x i ), the valuation function v i (b i ) is introduced. Unlike the mapping b i , v i is determined individually.
As aforementioned, a user can choose its own objective and have its unique valuation function based on its application requirements and other local factors such as its battery power. Therefore, it is reasonable to consider the valuation function v i (b i ) and/or the objective o l chosen by user i as local/private information. In addition, while b i (x i ) is given by standard formulas such as the Shannon capacity, parameters in b i (x i ), e.g., the channel gain, can also be local information. While such information is required for solving an optimization problem in the network, it is not available to the network center unless reported/shared by the users. As a result, truthful reporting on such information from all users can be necessary for finding the solution to a considered problem. The network center, which coordinates and manages the network, is assumed to be not selfish and always truthful.
The following two subsections introduce the two problems considered in this work.
B. The User-Centric Problem (UCP)
The network coordinates the resource allocation to maximize the sum-valuation in the network. It is represented by the following problem:
where X max and x max are constants. Note that the adoption of the valuation v i (b i ) includes the weighted-sum optimization as a special case when
, ∀i. Problem (1) also includes the NUM problems with all users using the same objective, such as a sum-rate optimization problem, as special cases.
Unlike classic NUM problems, local information is captured in this model through the mapping v i and/or the objective o l chosen by user i. Evidently, solving problem (1), in either a centralized or a distributed approach, requires all users to truthfully reveal their local information. To solve (1) in a centralized approach, user i needs to report its chosen objective, the mapping v i (b i ), and other local information (e.g., the parameter set) to the center.
To solve (1) in a distributed approach, assuming that the problem is convex and dual decomposition is used, user i should report its solution to the problem of maximizing v i (b i (x i )) − λx i iteratively, where λ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with constraint (1b).
If any user reports untruthfully, the solution, assuming that it can be found, might not be the solution to the original problem, i.e., problem (1) .
2 while other users report truthfully, the obtained solution is the solution to the following problem:
As each user has its own objective and valuation, assuming truthful reporting can be unconvincing. If the solution to (2) is better than the solution to (1) from the perspective of user l, user l can be motivated to report untruthfully.
Therefore, a mechanism is required to incentivize users to report truthfully. For the UCP, a common pricing mechanism, i.e., dual pricing [24] , [38] [39] [40] [41] [42] , will be studied in details.
C. The Network-Centric Problem (NCP)
While problem (1) is from the perspective of sum-valuation of users, a different solution can be preferred by the network center. Assume the center prefers the solution to the following problem based on its own objective and
III. MECHANISM AND INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY
The concept of mechanism and incentive compatibility is briefly introduced in this section, 5 while strategies and incentives in the considered system model will be described.
A mechanism is a tuple {S 1 , . . . , S N , Γ(·)} that consists of a set of possible actions S i for each user and specifies an outcome based on a social choice function Γ(·) for each possible combination of actions of users [16] . 6 Specifically, in a quasilinear mechanism, Γ(·) specifies a transfer t i (a payment if t i > 0 or charge if t i < 0) to user i, which renders user i's final utility u i to be u i = v i + t i (i.e., its valuation of the outcome plus the transfer).
User i chooses its action from S i based on its local information and the knowledge on how the outcome and transfer are decided. A common action is to report a value (e.g., a solution, a demand, a quote, etc.). A mechanism is dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) if truthful reporting is the best strategy for each user regardless of strategies used by other users [16] . A mechanism is ex post incentive compatible (EPIC) if truthful reporting is the best strategy for any user given that other users also report truthfully.
Several metrics are used to evaluate a mechanism. A mechanism is efficient if the outcome maximizes the sum valuation of all users. A mechanism is individually rational if each user is guaranteed to have a nonnegative utility.
A quasi-linear mechanism is considered budget-balanced if i t i ≤ 0.
For the UCP, reporting occurs in each iteration of distributed optimization while solving problem (1). Specifically
• Iteration j = 0. Network (center) chooses an initial value λ 0 for the Lagrange multiplier λ and broadcast λ 0 .
• User i, ∀i: expected to report the solution to max v i (x i ) − λ j x i subject to (1c).
• Network (center) sets
• Repeat the above two steps until x j i , ∀i converge.
The sequence of reports {x j i }, ∀i determines whether the algorithm can converge 7 and whether the solution found is the optimal solution to the original problem (1) . The strategy of a user is to choose a report x j i given the true x j i and λ j in each iteration j. An example mechanism that specifies the resource allocation outcome and the transfer is given below
where f t (x) is a function for determining transfers.
A common pricing mechanism for distributed solution finding in the literature is dual pricing [24] , [38] - [42] , which interprets and applies the dual variable λ in the aforementioned distributed optimization procedure as a per-unit price. Equivalently, t i = f t (x i ) = −λx i in (4). It can be seen that dual pricing is individually rational and budget-balanced. However, it is shown by a two-user example in [19] that dual pricing is not incentive compatible when one user is a leader and another is a follower. It is also shown in [34] that a dual pricing based auction is 5 For more details, one can refer to [37] . 6 An indirect mechanism is assumed here. 7 Here the term "converge" refers to "not diverge" but not necessarily "converge to the optimal solution". It should be noted that strategies of a user can be extremely rich, i.e., represented by all mapping from
Even if a user makes a decision in each iteration without using historical information, its strategy space still consists of all mappings from {x 
IV. INCENTIVE FOR TRUTHFUL REPORTING IN THE UCP: A STUDY ON DUAL PRICING
In this section, dual pricing, as a pricing mechanism for solution finding in distributed optimization, is studied.
The focus is on whether a user would report truthfully, i.e., v i = v i , so that the solution to the original problem (1) can be found. Notations used in this section are given in Table I . Lemma 1: The utility of user i satisfies u i ({s i , s Lemma 1 shows that, when a user intends to report untruthfully, it should avoid any untruthful reporting strategy that can unilaterally drive λ up even if it can acquire more resource by using such a strategy.
Based on the assumptions on
Lemma 2: User i can unilaterally affect the price through untruthful reporting such that λ ⋆ (s i , s 
Proof : Please refer to Section B in Appendix.
Lemma 2 shows that each user has the ability to unilaterally drive λ down through untruthful reporting as long as its share of the resource when everyone reports truthfully, i.e., x
max , truthful reporting is not optimal for any user i with
Proof : Please refer to Section C in Appendix.
Lemma 3 shows that an untruthful reporting strategy can result in a smaller share of resource but yield a larger utility for a user due to a lower price. Such a strategy is related to demand reduction, and discussions on a simpler discrete case in which resources are multiple indivisible items for sale can be found in [43] . An illustration of Lemma 3 is shown in Fig. 2 , where v i and λ i x i are the true valuation function and the cost with truthful reporting, respectively, and v i and λ i x i are an untruthfully-reported valuation and the corresponding cost, respectively. The variables u i ,ũ i , and u i are the utility of user i with truthful reporting, the utility of user i if v i were the truthful valuation, and the utility actually acquired by user i with untruthful reporting based on v i , respectively. Lemma 1 to Lemma 3 provide insights into dual pricing as a mechanism for a distributed resource allocation problem step by step. First, it is shown by Lemma 1 that dual pricing can prevent untruthful reporting that would intensify the competition and drive the price λ up. Next, Lemma 2 shows that users that would be allocated a nonzero share of resource when everyone report truthfully can unilaterally drive λ downward. Lemma 3 shows that such a user can benefit from driving λ downward when all other users report truthfully except for trivial cases in which the resource is oversupplied, i.e., implies that truthful reporting is optimal for a user when it cannot afford any resource under dual pricing. The above insights lead to the following remark.
Remark 1: Under dual pricing, reporting truthfully is optimal for a user only when the resource is oversupplied or when it cannot afford any resource.
Theorem 1: Dual pricing, when used as a pricing mechanism, is not EPIC.
Proof : Combining Lemma 1 to Lemma 3 proves this result.
The results in Lemma 1 to Lemma 3 are obtained without needing to know the specific local valuations of the users. It implies that a rational user can also obtain the above insights while choosing its reporting strategy and realize that truthful reporting is unlikely to be optimal.
As dual pricing is not incentive compatible, a different mechanism is needed to guarantee truthful reporting in a distributed optimization. The extension of classic Groves mechanisms to algorithmic mechanism design can be adopted here [19] . The mechanism is implemented through an algorithm with dual-decomposition based iterations while, in addition to their local solutions, users are also required to report their valuations in each iteration. The network center updates the dual variable, performs the convergence check, and charges each user a VCG based cost instead of a dual-price based cost at convergence. For any given iteration, the mechanism is not incentive compatible. However, the mechanism is shown to be asymptotically DSIC, which yields a diminishing return for an untruthful reporting user as the algorithm proceeds. We remark that the same extension of Groves mechanisms is also asymptotically DSIC when a projected gradient ascent is used, in which case the coordinator is not computationally 
Remark 2:
The SEM provides an equal and fair utility gain, i.e., ϕ TR − ρ TR + αs c , to both users in any successful exchange. 
Define
and Ψ l = {ψ l ij }. For any given i ∈ S l 1 and j ∈ S l 2 in iteration l, define the following sets
For simplicity, define a |S l 1 | × |S l 2 | matrix W l with its elements determined by
as the set of row indices corresponding to the rows of W l i,j with at least one nonzero element. With the above definitions, the ESEM is given in Algorithm 2, in which Line 4 and Line 7 are the steps executed by the users and others by the center.
Theorem 2: The ESEM in Algorithm 2 is EPIC and individually rational if {α
is a nonincreasing sequence.
Proof : See Section F in Appendix.
It is worth noting that there exist more forms of untruthful reporting in an iterative procedure than in a one-shot exchange. Proved to be incentive compatible, ESEM can prevent all of the following cases of untruthful report including: (i) untruthfully report a larger ρ l i or φ l i in iteration l to achieve larger benefit, (ii) untruthfully report a smaller ρ l i or φ l i in iteration l to achieve larger benefit, and (iii) skipping an iteration to achieve a larger benefit when δ l changes.
Algorithm 2 Extended Subsidized Exchange Mechanism (ESEM)
Determine α l and announces δ l to users 3: for User i = 1 to N do 4:
Report (7) and (9) . Calculate W l using (10) and (11).
11:
exit with x 
break the inner while loop 29: end if 
VI. APPLICATION ON UNDERLAY D2D COMMUNICATIONS
The modeling, analysis, and mechanisms from the preceding sections can be applied in networks featuring a distributed/semi-distributed structure in which users have individual utilities and local information. In this section, the UCP and the NCP will be re-modeled in an application of underlay D2D communications. Other applications in which the proposed model and results may apply include but are not limited to: spectrum leasing in cognitive radio, mobile crowdsensing, cooperative data dissemination in vehicular ad-hoc networks, demand response in smart grid, and cooperative caching.
Consider a cellular network in an urban environment with dense microcells as shown in Fig. 4 . An underlay based D2D communications is adopted, and resource blocks (RBs) for cellular communications are reused by D2D communications. A microcell is divided into D2D reuse areas, and RBs can be reused by different D2D links in different reuse areas. 9 For cross-area D2D links, e.g., link c in Fig. 4 , the D2D link can communicate when the microcell BS (microBS) can assign an RB that is available in both areas. D2D links associated with different microBS cannot communicate directly. To control the interference from D2D to cellular and other D2D communications, two assumptions are made. First, the maximum transmit power allowed for D2D communications, denoted as p max , is smaller than that allowed for cellular communications. Second, the total transmit power of all D2D communications reusing the same RB in each microcell is limited by P max .
Denote the kth D2D RB and the set of D2D RBs as b k and B, respectively, and the size of B as N B . Also 
where x m,i , x m,j , and x s,j represent the transmitted signal of the ith D2D link using b k in microcell m, the jth The first item in (13) is the intended signal, and the second to the fifth items represent the interference from other D2D links in the same microcell, D2D links in the neighboring cells, the cellular link in the same microcell, and cellular links in the neighboring microcells, respectively. The channels incorporate Rayleigh fading and large scale propagation path-loss. It is assumed that D2D links have no preference in particular RBs.
The data rate corresponding to Eq. (13) is given as
where g
represents the channel power gain, and
is the overall interference power at the receiver of the target D2D link. The variables g s,i , respectively. Considering the significant difference between the coverage of cellular and D2D links, the smaller maximum transmit power for a D2D link, and the total power constraint for D2D links, it is assumed that cellular communications are the major interferer of D2D communications. The assumption is appropriate in an urban scenario with dense microcells and small microcell radius. The interference is in turn modeled as a Gaussian random variable [26] . The corresponding energy efficiency is given by will be denoted as p i , r i , and e i , respectively.
As mentioned in Section II, each link determines its own objective o i , which can be either rate or energy efficiency in this case, without needing to notify the microBS. Correspondingly,
A mircoBS may coordinate its D2D links to maximize the sum-valuation, i.e,
The above problem could accommodate more constraints, e.g., a minimum rate constraint for D2D links with an energy efficiency objective, while the results in previous sections can still apply. Nevertheless, the above basic form is used since the focus is on incentive instead of optimization. Problem (17) corresponds to the UCP, i.e., problem (1) . However, when the D2D links adopt the solution to (17) , it is possible that the microBS has preference for a power allocation solution to a different problem, e.g.,
where
is the microBS's valuation representing a network preference. Problem (18) corresponds to the NCP, i.e., problem (3).
The next section will demonstrate the results obtained in the UCP and NCP for this application using the above models.
VII. SIMULATION EXAMPLES
With the D2D application as an example, this section demonstrates the analysis on dual pricing as well as the proposed SEM and ESEM in the preceding sections. The common setup for all simulation examples are as follows.
The radius of a cell is 500 meters, and the distance between D2D transceivers is in [5, 25] meters. The noise spectral is used for Large-scale propagation [46] , where non-line-of-sight (NOS) channels are assumed. 10 The small-scale fading is modeled by a Rayleigh fading channel with the channel response following CN (0, 1). The valuation function used as an example here is v i (b i ) = 1 − e −εibi [36] , where b i can be r i (given by equation (14)) or e i (given by equation (16) i.e., ε j = ε j , ∀j = i. 11 The solid hexagram marker on each curve marks the utility (Fig. 6 ) and power allocation (Fig. 7) when the corresponding link also reports truthfully, i.e., ε i = ε i . From Fig. 6 , it can be seen that reporting truthfully does not yield the maximum utility for a link. This illustrates the fact that reporting truthfully is not EPIC, as suggested by Theorem 1. Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 jointly show that any utility larger than the utility given by truthful reporting corresponds to an allocated power smaller than the allocated power in the case of truthful reporting. This validates the result in Lemma 3. 
The overall interference power from all sources at each D2D receiver is generated randomly in the range of 5dB to 20dB of noise power. For each choice of the parameter α in SEM, 100 samples are used. The first plot in Fig. 8 shows the chance of successful exchange versus the center's choice of α. The second plot in Fig. 8 shows the average utility gain from an exchange for a microBS versus α. The figure illustrates the aforementioned trade-off for the center, i.e., a larger α corresponds to a larger chance of success but a smaller utility gain. would be achieved by a virtual optimal mechanism that is efficient, budget-balanced, and incentive compatible.
The ESEM is implemented 50 times with a = 2, σ = 0.01. The traces of ν and p − p † 2 are shown in Fig 9. A step size of δ l = 10 −2 is used. Due to the randomness in choosing a candidate link in the ESEM, the traces from different runs can be different. In Fig 9 , the utility gain for the microBS from an exchange is limited due to a small a and, as a result, it cannot provide enough subsidy for p to converge to p † (this can be seen from the bottom subplot in Fig 9) . However, despite of the difference in the traces, ν and p − p † at the output are almost identical for each run. For example, the average ν at the final iteration in Fig 9 over the 50 runs is 1.9695 while the difference between the maximum and the minimum ν is only 3.1% of this average. 12 . The progress of utility gain for all 20 D2D links in one run of ESEM is shown in Fig 10. It can be seen that the utilities of all links are nondecreasing in ESEM, which illustrates the individual rationality property of ESEM.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Incentive for truthful reporting is studied for utility optimization problems with local information. The proposed model allows each user to adopt an individual objective and a valuation function, incorporated as its local information, and connects the optimization and the incentive perspectives. Dual pricing is shown to be not EPIC for finding a solution to the UCP. With dual pricing, reporting truthfully is shown to be optimal for a user only when the resource is over-supplied or when the user cannot afford any resource. If the network center intends to adopt a solution different from the one accepted by the users, the solution needs to be also preferred by at least one user.
Otherwise, no incentive mechanism can specify a condition to guarantee the implementation of the solution and at the same time guarantee truthful reporting. In the two-user case, whether such a solution can be implemented is determined in one shot. In the multiuser case, the switch between solutions must go through an iterative process. The proposed SEM and ESEM achieve incentive compatibility and provide nonnegative utility gains to both the users and the center. Simulations for a D2D application scenario validate the analysis of dual pricing and demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed SEM and ESEM. 
where the equalities with mark (a) follow from KKT conditions, and the inequality with mark (b) holds because 
Case iv: iterative, user initiates. Reporting is not truthful in such case because user i proposes different t i through the iterations, which cannot all be equal to v i (x † i ) − v i (x ⋆ i ). In summary, a mechanism cannot simultaneously be incentive compatible and guarantee the implementation of
E. Proof of Lemma 5
The utility gain for the users, as a function of quotes ρ and ϕ, from participating in the procedure in Algorithm 1 is π 1 (ϕ, ρ) = (ϕ + αs c ) − ρ DSIC is achieved if π 1 (ϕ, ρ) ≤ π 1 (ϕ, ρ TR ), ∀ρ, ∀ϕ and π 2 (ϕ, ρ) ≤ π 2 (ϕ TR , ρ), ∀ϕ, ∀ρ. From (33a) and (33b), it can be seen that π 1 (ϕ, ρ) is in fact independent on ρ, and π 2 (ϕ, ρ) is independent on ϕ. Therefore, when ϕ+αs c ≥ ρ, it holds that π 1 (ϕ, ρ) = π 1 (ϕ, ρ TR ), ∀ϕ and π 2 (ϕ, ρ) = π 2 (ϕ TR , ρ), ∀ρ. Meanwhile, from the perspective of user 1, the chance that ϕ + αs c ≥ ρ is smaller than the chance that ϕ + αs c ≥ ρ TR for any ρ > ρ TR . Therefore, reporting a ρ with ρ > ρ TR does not increase π 1 (ϕ, ρ) when an exchange is made but increases the chance of no exchange, in which case π 1 (ϕ, ρ) = 0 ≤ π 1 (ϕ, ρ TR ). Similarly, reporting a ϕ with ϕ < ϕ TR does not increase π 2 (ϕ, ρ)
when an exchange is made but increases the chance of no exchange, in which case π 2 (ϕ, ρ) = 0 ≤ π 2 (ϕ TR , ρ).
Therefore, π 1 (ϕ, ρ) ≤ π 1 (ϕ, ρ TR ), ∀ρ, ∀ϕ and π 2 (ϕ, ρ) ≤ π 2 (ϕ TR , ρ), ∀ϕ, ∀ρ regardless of whether the condition ϕ + αs c ≥ ρ is satisfied or not.
Individual rationality follows from the fact that π 1 (ϕ, ρ) ≥ 0 and π 2 (ϕ, ρ) ≥ 0 based on (33a) and (33b).
F. Proof of Theorem 2
The proof for individual rationality follows the same logic as that in the proof of Lemma 5 and is omitted. Proof of incentive compatibility is given as follows. Truthful Report means that W l is selected in the fifth step of Algorithm 2) and i =ĩ with report ρ
